$XRP po gwałtownym ożywieniu spodziewana jest korekta. Bot animatora rynku firmy Ripple podnosi cenę, aby narzucić klientom najwyższą możliwą cenę.

Tutaj lekkie odbicie, a potem zobaczymy.

#Binance : tak, banujemy #scammers . Również Binance:

NIE

Jaki bieg byków? Wkrótce stracisz wszystkie swoje pieniądze. Życzenia nie tworzą rynku.

Idę do zera

all this trash is exiting at -15%
don't believe the lies of people who are trying to rob you

well well well

Possible

$ETH wydobywanie zakończyło się 2 lata temu. Odzwierciedlenie ceny zajęło 720 dni. Im większy rynek, tym staje się on bardziej sztywny. To samo dotyczy $BTC po.

Byki zostały wystarczająco ukarane. Wyślij go w górę, przynajmniej na chwilę. $BTC $ETH

This looks reasonable

You've been told countless times that the bull market is over but you never learn

Later yesterday this was confirmed by 1h 99ma resistance on 1h frame, first red candle opening on daily and ma violation 4h as well

$ORDI uptrend closing, ready to correct with the rest of the market

We need more Mahmood analysts and their deranged delusions

You fools are lost. You think that crypto inflow to the exchanges is bullish and crypto outflow to wallets is berish. The only double digit thing is your IQ.

part 5:
Each account keeper accepts the highest bids (among those who actually broadcasted solutions) in terms of nominal cost per unit of b-money created and credits the bidders' accounts accordingly.

part 4:
The protocol proposed in this article allows untraceable pseudonymous entities to cooperate with each other more efficiently, by providing them with a medium of exchange and a method of enforcing contracts. The protocol can probably be made more efficient and secure, but I hope this is a step toward making crypto-anarchy a practical as well as theoretical possibility. ------- Appendix A: alternative b-money creation One of the more problematic parts in the b-money protocol is money creation. This part of the protocol requires that all of the account keepers decide and agree on the cost of particular computations. Unfortunately because computing technology tends to advance rapidly and not always publicly, this information may be unavailable, inaccurate, or outdated, all of which would cause serious problems for the protocol. So I propose an alternative money creation subprotocol, in which account keepers (everyone in the first protocol, or the servers in the second protocol) instead decide and agree on the amount of b-money to be created each period, with the cost of creating that money determined by an auction. Each money creation period is divided up into four phases, as follows: 1. Planning. The account keepers compute and negotiate with each other to determine an optimal increase in the money supply for the next period. Whether or not the account keepers can reach a consensus, they each broadcast their money creation quota and any macroeconomic calculations done to support the figures. 2. Bidding. Anyone who wants to create b-money broadcasts a bid in the form of <x, y> where x is the amount of b-money he wants to create, and y is an unsolved problem from a predetermined problem class. Each problem in this class should have a nominal cost (in MIPS-years say) which is publicly agreed on. 3. Computation. After seeing the bids, the ones who placed bids in the bidding phase may now solve the problems in their bids and broadcast the solutions. 4. Money creation.

part 3:

If a contract concludes without dispute, each party broadcasts a signed message "The contract with SHA-1 hash H concludes without reparations." or possibly "The contract with SHA-1 hash H concludes with the following reparations: ..." Upon the broadcast of all signatures, every participant credits the account of each party by the amount of his maximum reparation, removes the contract account, then credits or debits the account of each party according to the reparation schedule if there is one. 5. The enforcement of contracts. If the parties to a contract cannot agree on an appropriate conclusion even with the help of the arbitrator, each party broadcasts a suggested reparation/fine schedule and any arguments or evidence in his favor. Each participant makes a determination as to the actual reparations and/or fines, and modifies his accounts accordingly. In the second protocol, the accounts of who has how much money are kept by a subset of the participants (called servers from now on) instead of everyone. These servers are linked by a Usenet-style broadcast channel. The format of transaction messages broadcasted on this channel remain the same as in the first protocol, but the affected participants of each transaction should verify that the message has been received and successfully processed by a randomly selected subset of the servers. Since the servers must be trusted to a degree, some mechanism is needed to keep them honest. Each server is required to deposit a certain amount of money in a special account to be used as potential fines or rewards for proof of misconduct. Also, each server must periodically publish and commit to its current money creation and money ownership databases. Each participant should verify that his own account balances are correct and that the sum of the account balances is not greater than the total amount of money created. This prevents the servers, even in total collusion, from permanently and costlessly expanding the money supply. New servers can also use the published databases to synchronize with existing servers.