In game theory, the 'intelligent pig game' is a famous example of Nash equilibrium.
Suppose there is a big pig and a small pig in the pigpen. At one end of the pigpen, there is a feeding trough, and at the other end, there is a button that controls the supply of pig feed. Pressing the button will supply 10 units of pig feed to the trough, but whoever presses the button will first incur a cost of 2 units. The button and the feeding trough are at opposite ends; the pig that presses the button has to bear a cost of 2 units and loses the opportunity to reach the trough first to eat.
If the small pig reaches the trough first to eat, due to a lack of competition, the eating speed is average, and the final ratio of food consumed by the big and small pigs is 6:4; if they reach the trough at the same time, the big pig's eating speed increases, and the final ratio of benefits between the big and small pigs is 7:3; if the big pig reaches the trough first, it will monopolize all the remaining pig feed, and the final ratio of benefits between the big and small pigs is 9:1.
Therefore, under the premise that both pigs are intelligent, the final result is: the small pig chooses to wait, and the big pig goes to press the button.
