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Interesting Facts About SUI Coin
1. #SUI is a smart contract platform: - Maintained by a permissionless set of validators - Offers scalability and unprecedented low-latency for simple use cases.
2. Sui tokens and validators: - Sui has a native token called SUI, with a fixed supply - Users can stake their SUI tokens with validators in a Delegated Proof-of-Stake model within an epoch.
3. Transactions: - A transaction in Sui is a change to the blockchain - More complex transactions go through the Narwhal and Bullshark DAG-based #mempool and efficient Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) consensus.
4. Parallel agreement - a breakthrough in system design: - Sui scales horizontally with no upper bound to meet application demand while maintaining extremely low operating costs per transaction - Sui takes a significant leap in scalability by enabling parallel agreement on causally independent transactions.
5. Unmatched scalability, instant settlement: - Sui scales horizontally to meet the demands of applications - Network capacity grows in proportion to the increase in Sui validators' processing power by adding workers.
6. A safe smart contract language accessible to mainstream developers: - Sui Move smart contracts power Sui applications - Sui Move's design prevents issues such as reentrancy vulnerabilities, poison tokens, and spoofed token approvals.
7. Ability to define rich and composable on-chain assets: - Sui’s scalability is not limited to transaction processing - Storage is also low-cost and horizontally scalable.
8. Better user experience for web3 apps: - Sui aims to make Sui the most accessible smart contract platform - Empowering developers to create great user experiences in web3.
#crypto2023 #SUI $SUI
2. Sui tokens and validators: - Sui has a native token called SUI, with a fixed supply - Users can stake their SUI tokens with validators in a Delegated Proof-of-Stake model within an epoch.
3. Transactions: - A transaction in Sui is a change to the blockchain - More complex transactions go through the Narwhal and Bullshark DAG-based #mempool and efficient Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) consensus.
4. Parallel agreement - a breakthrough in system design: - Sui scales horizontally with no upper bound to meet application demand while maintaining extremely low operating costs per transaction - Sui takes a significant leap in scalability by enabling parallel agreement on causally independent transactions.
5. Unmatched scalability, instant settlement: - Sui scales horizontally to meet the demands of applications - Network capacity grows in proportion to the increase in Sui validators' processing power by adding workers.
6. A safe smart contract language accessible to mainstream developers: - Sui Move smart contracts power Sui applications - Sui Move's design prevents issues such as reentrancy vulnerabilities, poison tokens, and spoofed token approvals.
7. Ability to define rich and composable on-chain assets: - Sui’s scalability is not limited to transaction processing - Storage is also low-cost and horizontally scalable.
8. Better user experience for web3 apps: - Sui aims to make Sui the most accessible smart contract platform - Empowering developers to create great user experiences in web3.
#crypto2023 #SUI $SUI
#LightningNetwork vulnerability as explained on X platform by @mononautical;
The thread discusses a newly discovered vulnerability in the Lightning Network known as the "lightning replacement cycling attack." In this attack, the attacker collaborates with a channel partner to steal funds from a Lightning Network user, referred to as Bob. The attack relies on the ability to replace certain transactions in the #mempool with higher fee transactions. Here's a summary of how the attack works:
1. Lightning Network payments are secured using Hash/Time Lock Contracts (HTLCs) that allow conditional payments between sender and receiver.
2. When a payment is routed through multiple channels, HTLCs are used at each hop, protecting the payment with the same hashlock.
3. The attack targets Bob, who has an outgoing HTLC to Carol and an incoming HTLC from Alice, both with different expiration block heights (T and T+Δ).
4. When the outgoing HTLC to Carol expires at block height T, Bob is forced to time it out on-chain by broadcasting a commitment transaction to close the channel and then sending an "htlc-timeout" transaction to reclaim his funds.
5. Unbeknownst to Bob, Alice and Carol have prepared for the attack. They broadcast unrelated low-fee transactions (the "cycle parent" and "cycle child") and then, when they see Bob's "htlc-timeout" transaction in the mempool, they broadcast an "htlc-preimage" transaction, which spends both the HTLC output and an output from the cycle parent with a higher fee rate.
6. The "htlc-preimage" transaction replaces both the cycle child and Bob's "htlc-timeout" transaction in the mempool, allowing the attackers to take the preimage and redeem the incoming HTLC from Alice.
7. The attackers then repeat the cycle to eject Bob's "htlc-timeout" transaction every time he rebroadcasts it, potentially leaving Bob out of pocket for the entire payment value.
#bitcoin #BTC
The thread discusses a newly discovered vulnerability in the Lightning Network known as the "lightning replacement cycling attack." In this attack, the attacker collaborates with a channel partner to steal funds from a Lightning Network user, referred to as Bob. The attack relies on the ability to replace certain transactions in the #mempool with higher fee transactions. Here's a summary of how the attack works:
1. Lightning Network payments are secured using Hash/Time Lock Contracts (HTLCs) that allow conditional payments between sender and receiver.
2. When a payment is routed through multiple channels, HTLCs are used at each hop, protecting the payment with the same hashlock.
3. The attack targets Bob, who has an outgoing HTLC to Carol and an incoming HTLC from Alice, both with different expiration block heights (T and T+Δ).
4. When the outgoing HTLC to Carol expires at block height T, Bob is forced to time it out on-chain by broadcasting a commitment transaction to close the channel and then sending an "htlc-timeout" transaction to reclaim his funds.
5. Unbeknownst to Bob, Alice and Carol have prepared for the attack. They broadcast unrelated low-fee transactions (the "cycle parent" and "cycle child") and then, when they see Bob's "htlc-timeout" transaction in the mempool, they broadcast an "htlc-preimage" transaction, which spends both the HTLC output and an output from the cycle parent with a higher fee rate.
6. The "htlc-preimage" transaction replaces both the cycle child and Bob's "htlc-timeout" transaction in the mempool, allowing the attackers to take the preimage and redeem the incoming HTLC from Alice.
7. The attackers then repeat the cycle to eject Bob's "htlc-timeout" transaction every time he rebroadcasts it, potentially leaving Bob out of pocket for the entire payment value.
#bitcoin #BTC