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🇫🇷 Authorities in France arrest duo involved in Platypus Exploit ◾️Flash loan exploit drained protocol of over $9 million in assets and knocked Platypus USD (USP) off its peg. #exploit #France #BTC
🇫🇷 Authorities in France arrest duo involved in Platypus Exploit

◾️Flash loan exploit drained protocol of over $9 million in assets and knocked Platypus USD (USP) off its peg.

#exploit #France #BTC
How Was KyberSwap Exploited for $46 Million? ⚠️ #KyberSwap , a decentralized exchange, faced a security breach resulting in a $46 million loss across various crypto assets. The attack impacted wrapped Ether, #Lido-staked Ether, and Arbitrum funds, spanning multiple blockchains like Ethereum, Polygon, and others. Despite the protocol's warning to users and ongoing investigations, the breach caused a 68% drop in total value locked and significant asset withdrawals. The #exploit triggered a 7% dip in Kyber Network Crystal token prices, although they've partially recovered. This incident follows a vulnerability disclosure earlier in the year that didn't result in fund losses. #Binance #crypto2023
How Was KyberSwap Exploited for $46 Million? ⚠️

#KyberSwap , a decentralized exchange, faced a security breach resulting in a $46 million loss across various crypto assets.

The attack impacted wrapped Ether, #Lido-staked Ether, and Arbitrum funds, spanning multiple blockchains like Ethereum, Polygon, and others.

Despite the protocol's warning to users and ongoing investigations, the breach caused a 68% drop in total value locked and significant asset withdrawals.

The #exploit triggered a 7% dip in Kyber Network Crystal token prices, although they've partially recovered. This incident follows a vulnerability disclosure earlier in the year that didn't result in fund losses.

#Binance
#crypto2023
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🚨 BREAKING: The game on the #BLAST platform, #SSSHQ experienced an #exploit through a token contract bug, enabling users to double their own balances!
🚨 BREAKING: The game on the #BLAST platform, #SSSHQ experienced an #exploit through a token contract bug, enabling users to double their own balances!
How Did Stars Arena Use a 10% Bounty to Recover Stolen Crypto? 👀 Stars Arena, a Web3 social media platform, #recovered nearly 90% of the crypto stolen in an October 7 exploit, worth around $3 million, by agreeing to pay a 10% bounty, equivalent to 27,610 AVAX, worth nearly $257,000, to the exploiter. This bounty also compensated for 1,000 #AVAX worth over $9,000 seemingly lost by the exploiter in a bridge. Stars Arena is finalizing an audit of a new smart contract before placing the returned funds and relaunching the platform. The initial #exploit was caused by a security breach in the smart contract, but they've since secured funding and contracted a development team to address the issue. Additionally, Stars Arena's competitor, Friend.tech, faced SIM-swap attacks and has implemented security features to counter them. #Binance #crypto2023
How Did Stars Arena Use a 10% Bounty to Recover Stolen Crypto? 👀

Stars Arena, a Web3 social media platform, #recovered nearly 90% of the crypto stolen in an October 7 exploit, worth around $3 million, by agreeing to pay a 10% bounty, equivalent to 27,610 AVAX, worth nearly $257,000, to the exploiter.

This bounty also compensated for 1,000 #AVAX worth over $9,000 seemingly lost by the exploiter in a bridge.

Stars Arena is finalizing an audit of a new smart contract before placing the returned funds and relaunching the platform. The initial #exploit was caused by a security breach in the smart contract, but they've since secured funding and contracted a development team to address the issue.

Additionally, Stars Arena's competitor, Friend.tech, faced SIM-swap attacks and has implemented security features to counter them.

#Binance
#crypto2023
⚡️ KyberSwap exchange losses $47M in possible liquidity providers exploit KyberSwap appears to have suffered a $47M exploit of its Elastic Pools liquidity solution. The funds included $20.7M on Arbitrum, $15M on Optimism, $7M on Ethereum, $3M on Polygon, and $2M on Base. A large portion of the funds are denominated in various forms of ether, such as wrapped tokens and liquid staking tokens. $KNC #KNC #KyberSwap #exploit $MATIC $ARB #ARB #MATIC🔥🔥
⚡️ KyberSwap exchange losses $47M in possible liquidity providers exploit

KyberSwap appears to have suffered a $47M exploit of its Elastic Pools liquidity solution. The funds included $20.7M on Arbitrum, $15M on Optimism, $7M on Ethereum, $3M on Polygon, and $2M on Base. A large portion of the funds are denominated in various forms of ether, such as wrapped tokens and liquid staking tokens.

$KNC #KNC #KyberSwap #exploit $MATIC $ARB #ARB #MATIC🔥🔥
⚡️ Top 10 Crypto Protocols Exploits in November During November 2023, the crypto industry saw a loss of $343M across the web3 ecosystem. According to Immunefi's report, $335.5M was lost to hacks across 18 specific incidents, and $7.46M was lost to fraud across 23 specific incidents. Let's analyze the largest losses of the month! #exploit #hack #hacks $KNC $HT $DYDX $RAFT $XCN #dydx #KNC
⚡️ Top 10 Crypto Protocols Exploits in November

During November 2023, the crypto industry saw a loss of $343M across the web3 ecosystem. According to Immunefi's report, $335.5M was lost to hacks across 18 specific incidents, and $7.46M was lost to fraud across 23 specific incidents. Let's analyze the largest losses of the month!

#exploit #hack #hacks $KNC $HT $DYDX $RAFT $XCN #dydx #KNC
Via #AnciliaAlerts on X, @rugged_dot_art has identified a re-entrancy #vulnerability in a smart contract with address 0x9733303117504c146a4e22261f2685ddb79780ef, allowing an attacker to #exploit it and gain 11 #ETH . The attack transaction can be traced on #Etherscan at https://etherscan.io/tx/0x5a63da39b5b83fccdd825fed0226f330f802e995b8e49e19fbdd246876c67e1f. Despite reaching out to the owner three days ago, there has been no response. The vulnerability resides in the targetedPurchase() function, where a user can input arbitrary swapParams, including commands to 4. This triggers the UNIVERSAL_ROUTER.execute() function, and as per Uniswap Technical Reference, command 4 corresponds to SWEEP, invoking the sweep() function. This function sends ETH back to the user's contract, leading to a re-entrancy issue. Within targetedPurchase(), a balance check is performed before and after calling _executeSwap(). Due to the re-entrancy problem, a user can stake tokens (e.g., from a flashloan) to satisfy the balance check, ensuring a successful purchase action where tokens are transferred to the user. The urgency of the situation is underscored by the ongoing waiting period for the owner's response, emphasizing the need for prompt attention to mitigate potential exploitation.
Via #AnciliaAlerts on X, @rugged_dot_art has identified a re-entrancy #vulnerability in a smart contract with address 0x9733303117504c146a4e22261f2685ddb79780ef, allowing an attacker to #exploit it and gain 11 #ETH . The attack transaction can be traced on #Etherscan at https://etherscan.io/tx/0x5a63da39b5b83fccdd825fed0226f330f802e995b8e49e19fbdd246876c67e1f. Despite reaching out to the owner three days ago, there has been no response.
The vulnerability resides in the targetedPurchase() function, where a user can input arbitrary swapParams, including commands to 4. This triggers the UNIVERSAL_ROUTER.execute() function, and as per Uniswap Technical Reference, command 4 corresponds to SWEEP, invoking the sweep() function. This function sends ETH back to the user's contract, leading to a re-entrancy issue.
Within targetedPurchase(), a balance check is performed before and after calling _executeSwap(). Due to the re-entrancy problem, a user can stake tokens (e.g., from a flashloan) to satisfy the balance check, ensuring a successful purchase action where tokens are transferred to the user. The urgency of the situation is underscored by the ongoing waiting period for the owner's response, emphasizing the need for prompt attention to mitigate potential exploitation.
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Via @Michaeltalkhere ($BPET dev team lead ) on X regarding the #PvP contract #exploit As announced, I would like to disclose the details of the exploit and how did we get the money back. Firsly, the reason of the exploit was there was a bug in ‘request swap from #POTION to #BPET ’ functionality that makes the exploiter be able to withdraw excessive amounts of $BPET tokens from the PvP contract after staking their own tokens. Below are some noticeable withdrawing transactions the exploiter made. (https://arbiscan.io/tx/0x058b8808e721f68c01c62ad70687f38f39d749bfc9d0e8f6be839c3af603dec6) (https://arbiscan.io/tx/0x1ad1f7536e2d91cc5aeef6e29f948ee73fa760a482b0455ca78adade83c4ef53) (https://arbiscan.io/tx/0x500713e7c025d5ab71e2446069a46a60009ef8060d2537bc4b29296c6f76f9d7) Right after becoming fully aware of the exploit, we did 2 things - Checked out to see if the exploiter’s addresses can be mapped with any Twitter profiles of any xPet users (and we found the user mapping with one of the exploiter addresses) - Reached out to all partners in our network who can pour in the helps. They were explorer sites, centralized exchanges, privacy mixers, offramp tools, and security firms. To be specific, #Etherscan team helped us to tag all 4 addresses related to the exploiter on Ethereum on Arbiscan as ‘xPet exploiter’. Thanks for that, the exploiter addresses were visibly exposed to and closely-watched by the public. All the centralized exchange, privacy mixer, and offramp tool teams helped to take close notice In case any of the exploiting address would have interactions with centralized exchange Hot wallets, privacy mixer contracts, or offramp tool depositing addresses. The security firms has helped us follow all, even smallest, onchain traces from the exploiter In short, we had the combined efforts from multiple parties to closely monitoring the exploiter's movements and ensure that exploiter doesn’t have any chance to get the stolen funds mixed or obscured.
Via @Michaeltalkhere ($BPET dev team lead ) on X regarding the #PvP contract #exploit

As announced, I would like to disclose the details of the exploit and how did we get the money back.
Firsly, the reason of the exploit was there was a bug in ‘request swap from #POTION to #BPET ’ functionality that makes the exploiter be able to withdraw excessive amounts of $BPET tokens from the PvP contract after staking their own tokens.
Below are some noticeable withdrawing transactions the exploiter made.
(https://arbiscan.io/tx/0x058b8808e721f68c01c62ad70687f38f39d749bfc9d0e8f6be839c3af603dec6)
(https://arbiscan.io/tx/0x1ad1f7536e2d91cc5aeef6e29f948ee73fa760a482b0455ca78adade83c4ef53)
(https://arbiscan.io/tx/0x500713e7c025d5ab71e2446069a46a60009ef8060d2537bc4b29296c6f76f9d7)

Right after becoming fully aware of the exploit, we did 2 things

- Checked out to see if the exploiter’s addresses can be mapped with any Twitter profiles of any xPet users (and we found the user mapping with one of the exploiter addresses)

- Reached out to all partners in our network who can pour in the helps. They were explorer sites, centralized exchanges, privacy mixers, offramp tools, and security firms.

To be specific, #Etherscan team helped us to tag all 4 addresses related to the exploiter on Ethereum on Arbiscan as ‘xPet exploiter’. Thanks for that, the exploiter addresses were visibly exposed to and closely-watched by the public. All the centralized exchange, privacy mixer, and offramp tool teams helped to take close notice In case any of the exploiting address would have interactions with centralized exchange Hot wallets, privacy mixer contracts, or offramp tool depositing addresses. The security firms has helped us follow all, even smallest, onchain traces from the exploiter

In short, we had the combined efforts from multiple parties to closely monitoring the exploiter's movements and ensure that exploiter doesn’t have any chance to get the stolen funds mixed or obscured.
New #GoFetch attack on Apple Silicon CPUs can steal #crypto keys. A new side-channel attack named "GoFetch" has been discovered, impacting Apple M1, M2, and M3 processors. This attack targets constant-time cryptographic implementations using data memory-dependent prefetchers (DMPs) found in modern Apple CPUs, allowing attackers to steal secret cryptographic keys from the CPU's cache. GoFetch was developed by a team of researchers who reported their findings to Apple in December 2023. Since this is a hardware-based vulnerability, impacted CPUs cannot be fixed. While software fixes could mitigate the flaw, they would degrade cryptographic performance. The attack leverages flaws in Apple's implementation of the DMP system, violating constant-time programming principles. Owners of affected Apple devices are advised to practice safe computing habits, including regular updates and cautious software installation. While Apple may introduce mitigations through software updates, they could impact performance. Disabling DMP may be an option for some CPUs but not for M1 and M2. The attack can be executed remotely, making it a serious concern for users. Apple has yet to provide further comments on this issue. #hack #exploit #vulnerability
New #GoFetch attack on Apple Silicon CPUs can steal #crypto keys.
A new side-channel attack named "GoFetch" has been discovered, impacting Apple M1, M2, and M3 processors. This attack targets constant-time cryptographic implementations using data memory-dependent prefetchers (DMPs) found in modern Apple CPUs, allowing attackers to steal secret cryptographic keys from the CPU's cache. GoFetch was developed by a team of researchers who reported their findings to Apple in December 2023. Since this is a hardware-based vulnerability, impacted CPUs cannot be fixed. While software fixes could mitigate the flaw, they would degrade cryptographic performance. The attack leverages flaws in Apple's implementation of the DMP system, violating constant-time programming principles. Owners of affected Apple devices are advised to practice safe computing habits, including regular updates and cautious software installation. While Apple may introduce mitigations through software updates, they could impact performance. Disabling DMP may be an option for some CPUs but not for M1 and M2. The attack can be executed remotely, making it a serious concern for users. Apple has yet to provide further comments on this issue.
#hack #exploit #vulnerability
He mined #Bitcoin when it was under $0.05 He held the keys to 25,000 $BTC The Tragic Story of how ALLINVAIN lost $1.6 billion in one of the biggest robberies in crypto history 🔥 ALLINVAIN backed up his wallet to Dropbox, Wuala, and SpiderOak. He later deleted them after he found out Dropbox employees could remotely access files. But the real issue was someone hacked his computer and stole the UNENCRYPTED wallet file. ALLINVAIN’s biggest mistake was that he kept his keys unencrypted on his computer. His hack is a reminder to always keep your private keys written in a secure OFFLINE location Even some of the biggest names in Bitcoin have suffered similar exploits Today ALLINVAIN’s story lives as a reminder of the importance of security and safety in btc . #Bitcoin❗ #exploit #security $BTC
He mined #Bitcoin when it was under $0.05

He held the keys to 25,000 $BTC

The Tragic Story of how ALLINVAIN lost $1.6 billion in one of the biggest robberies in crypto history 🔥

ALLINVAIN backed up his wallet to Dropbox, Wuala, and SpiderOak.

He later deleted them after he found out Dropbox employees could remotely access files.

But the real issue was someone hacked his computer and stole the UNENCRYPTED wallet file.

ALLINVAIN’s biggest mistake was that he kept his keys unencrypted on his computer.

His hack is a reminder to always keep your private keys written in a secure OFFLINE location

Even some of the biggest names in Bitcoin have suffered similar exploits
Today ALLINVAIN’s story lives as a reminder of the importance of security and safety in btc .
#Bitcoin❗ #exploit #security $BTC
The #Bedrock liquid restaking protocol has suffered an #exploit resulting in a $2 million loss. The exploit was discovered in the protocol's smart contract code, leading to unauthorized withdrawals. The Bedrock team is currently investigating the situation and has taken steps to prevent further losses by pausing the protocol. #Binance #restaking #TrendingTopic
The #Bedrock liquid restaking protocol has suffered an #exploit resulting in a $2 million loss. The exploit was discovered in the protocol's smart contract code, leading to unauthorized withdrawals.
The Bedrock team is currently investigating the situation and has taken steps to prevent further losses by pausing the protocol.
#Binance #restaking #TrendingTopic
Common Vulnerabilities in Cryptocurrency SystemsCryptographic systems underpin decentralized finance (DeFi) and blockchain ecosystems, offering users unparalleled control over digital assets. However, the sophistication of these systems also opens up a variety of attack vectors, from smart contracts to multisig wallets, and even hardware wallets. Developers, often focused on functionality, may overlook critical vulnerabilities, creating opportunities for sophisticated attacks like those seen in the Radiant Capital $50M hack. This article will explore the vulnerabilities within crypto systems and provide detailed insights into how they occur, drawing on the latest attack trends and often-overlooked developer mistakes. 1. Smart Contract Vulnerabilities How They Occur: Smart contracts are self-executing contracts with the terms of the agreement directly written into code. Their functionality is often complex, and errors or #vulnerabilities in the code can lead to catastrophic results. Hackers can exploit issues such as: - Reentrancy Attacks: When a smart contract calls an external contract, attackers can use #reentrancy to exploit the sequence of code execution, draining funds. - Example: In the 2016 DAO attack, reentrancy was used to repeatedly withdraw funds before the contract’s balance was updated, resulting in $60M of stolen $ETH . - Unchecked Return Values: Developers often overlook checking the return values of low-level calls. This can lead to a contract assuming a call has succeeded when it has not, leaving the contract vulnerable to exploitation. - Integer Overflow/Underflow: If a contract uses arithmetic operations without proper checks, overflow and underflow issues can occur. Attackers can #exploit these to create infinite tokens or drain funds. - Exploiting Token Approvals: Many DeFi protocols require users to approve token transfers. Attackers can exploit ongoing approvals or smart contracts that fail to properly manage token allowances. Mitigation Measures: - Use Libraries: Utilize audited libraries like OpenZeppelin to avoid common pitfalls in solidity programming such as integer overflow. - Reentrancy Guards: Include reentrancy guards to prevent recursive calls that could drain funds. - Audit Smart Contracts: Regularly audit contracts to detect vulnerabilities before deployment. - Limit Permissions: Encourage users to regularly review and revoke token approvals using tools like Etherscan’s token approval checker. 2. Multisig Wallet Vulnerabilities How They Occur: Multisig wallets (e.g., Gnosis Safe) require multiple private keys to authorize transactions, creating a barrier against single-point failures. However, if one or more signers are compromised, the system’s security can break down. Here’s how #Multisig wallets can be attacked: - Endpoint Compromise: Attackers can install malware, such as a Trojan, on team members' computers. This malware can intercept and modify signing requests before they are sent to the multisig wallet. In the Radiant Capital hack, a Trojan altered transaction data, tricking the hardware wallet into signing a malicious transfer of ownership without detection. - Hardware Wallet Interception: While hardware wallets are designed to securely sign transactions, they can still be manipulated if the device used to interact with the hardware wallet is compromised. If malware intercepts the transaction data before it reaches the hardware wallet, the user unknowingly approves a malicious transaction. - Atomic Execution Exploits: Attackers bundle several malicious actions (e.g., ownership transfers, contract upgrades) into one atomic transaction, making it nearly impossible to stop or detect the malicious activity before the funds are stolen. Mitigation Measures: - Endpoint Security: Implement anti-malware solutions on devices used for signing transactions. Keep these devices isolated from internet access where possible to reduce the risk of malware infections. - Cross-verification of Transactions: Ensure that all multisig signers review transaction data on different devices to detect any manipulation. If the same transaction appears differently on separate devices, it should trigger an immediate investigation. - Timelocks and Governance: Introduce timelocks to delay critical operations such as ownership transfers or large fund movements. Use governance processes to require community or multi-layer multisig approval for contract upgrades or ownership changes. 3. Hardware Wallet Vulnerabilities How They Occur: Hardware wallets provide offline storage of private keys, adding a layer of security against #hacks . However, they can still be exploited through indirect means: - Man-in-the-Middle Attacks: If a computer interacting with a hardware wallet is compromised, attackers can intercept and alter transaction requests before they are displayed on the hardware wallet screen. The user might sign a transaction believing it is legitimate, when in reality they are approving a malicious one. - Physical Attacks: Supply chain attacks can compromise hardware wallets at the manufacturing level, where malware is introduced during the production process. If the hardware wallet is tampered with before it reaches the user, attackers can potentially access the private keys. - Malware-Based Attacks: Like in the Radiant Capital hack, Trojans can replace legitimate transactions with malicious ones before they are sent to the hardware wallet, leading to unauthorized actions, such as contract upgrades or ownership transfers. Mitigation Measures: - Use Air-gapped Devices: Sign transactions using air-gapped devices that are not connected to the internet to reduce exposure to malware. - Cross-check Transactions: Ensure users always check the transaction details on their hardware wallet’s screen before confirming, comparing them with the intended action. - Regular Firmware Updates: Keep hardware wallets updated with the latest firmware to patch any potential vulnerabilities. - Device Authentication: Use hardware wallets from reputable manufacturers that include device authentication mechanisms to prevent tampering during the supply chain process. 4. Multisig Best Practices and Signature Verification Even though multisig wallets add layers of security, they are not foolproof. Weaknesses often arise from how multisig transactions are verified and executed, particularly in setups involving hardware wallets. How Vulnerabilities Occur: - Compromised Signers: If one or more signers in a multisig wallet are compromised, attackers can manipulate transaction requests, as seen in the Radiant Capital hack. The infection of team members' computers allowed for manipulation of multisig transactions before the hardware wallet even signed them. - Weak Cross-Verification: Multisig signers may assume that because they are in a secure setup, they do not need to verify transactions across multiple devices. This assumption can be exploited by attackers who alter transaction requests at the endpoint. Mitigation Measures: - Distributed Signing: Multisig signers should verify transactions across multiple devices and display methods to detect potential discrepancies in the data. - Anomaly Detection: Use anomaly detection systems to flag unusual transactions for review. Any inconsistencies between what is shown to different multisig signers should trigger a halt in the transaction. 5. Mitigation Lessons from Radiant Capital's Attack The Radiant Capital hack is a reminder that even the most sophisticated systems are vulnerable to multi-layered attacks that blend malware, multisig exploitation, and hardware wallet manipulation. The attack showed that combining multiple vulnerabilities (Trojan malware, hardware wallet interception, and atomic execution) can create an exploit that bypasses many traditional defenses. Key lessons: - Always Assume Endpoints Can Be Compromised: Even with a secure hardware wallet, attackers can intercept and modify transactions at the computer level. Therefore, endpoint security must be a top priority. - Atomic Execution Monitoring: Implement real-time monitoring of atomic transactions that can flag malicious activity before they are executed on-chain. - Governance and Timelock Mechanisms: Timelocks should be mandatory for sensitive operations, and governance processes should be in place to delay or prevent suspicious actions. By adopting a multi-layered approach to security, including smart contract audits, endpoint protections, and cross-verification of transactions, developers and users can better safeguard their assets from the increasingly sophisticated landscape of crypto exploits.

Common Vulnerabilities in Cryptocurrency Systems

Cryptographic systems underpin decentralized finance (DeFi) and blockchain ecosystems, offering users unparalleled control over digital assets. However, the sophistication of these systems also opens up a variety of attack vectors, from smart contracts to multisig wallets, and even hardware wallets. Developers, often focused on functionality, may overlook critical vulnerabilities, creating opportunities for sophisticated attacks like those seen in the Radiant Capital $50M hack. This article will explore the vulnerabilities within crypto systems and provide detailed insights into how they occur, drawing on the latest attack trends and often-overlooked developer mistakes.

1. Smart Contract Vulnerabilities
How They Occur:
Smart contracts are self-executing contracts with the terms of the agreement directly written into code. Their functionality is often complex, and errors or #vulnerabilities in the code can lead to catastrophic results. Hackers can exploit issues such as:
- Reentrancy Attacks: When a smart contract calls an external contract, attackers can use #reentrancy to exploit the sequence of code execution, draining funds.
- Example: In the 2016 DAO attack, reentrancy was used to repeatedly withdraw funds before the contract’s balance was updated, resulting in $60M of stolen $ETH .

- Unchecked Return Values: Developers often overlook checking the return values of low-level calls. This can lead to a contract assuming a call has succeeded when it has not, leaving the contract vulnerable to exploitation.
- Integer Overflow/Underflow: If a contract uses arithmetic operations without proper checks, overflow and underflow issues can occur. Attackers can #exploit these to create infinite tokens or drain funds.

- Exploiting Token Approvals: Many DeFi protocols require users to approve token transfers. Attackers can exploit ongoing approvals or smart contracts that fail to properly manage token allowances.
Mitigation Measures:
- Use Libraries: Utilize audited libraries like OpenZeppelin to avoid common pitfalls in solidity programming such as integer overflow.
- Reentrancy Guards: Include reentrancy guards to prevent recursive calls that could drain funds.
- Audit Smart Contracts: Regularly audit contracts to detect vulnerabilities before deployment.
- Limit Permissions: Encourage users to regularly review and revoke token approvals using tools like Etherscan’s token approval checker.

2. Multisig Wallet Vulnerabilities
How They Occur:
Multisig wallets (e.g., Gnosis Safe) require multiple private keys to authorize transactions, creating a barrier against single-point failures. However, if one or more signers are compromised, the system’s security can break down. Here’s how #Multisig wallets can be attacked:
- Endpoint Compromise: Attackers can install malware, such as a Trojan, on team members' computers. This malware can intercept and modify signing requests before they are sent to the multisig wallet. In the Radiant Capital hack, a Trojan altered transaction data, tricking the hardware wallet into signing a malicious transfer of ownership without detection.

- Hardware Wallet Interception: While hardware wallets are designed to securely sign transactions, they can still be manipulated if the device used to interact with the hardware wallet is compromised. If malware intercepts the transaction data before it reaches the hardware wallet, the user unknowingly approves a malicious transaction.
- Atomic Execution Exploits: Attackers bundle several malicious actions (e.g., ownership transfers, contract upgrades) into one atomic transaction, making it nearly impossible to stop or detect the malicious activity before the funds are stolen.
Mitigation Measures:
- Endpoint Security: Implement anti-malware solutions on devices used for signing transactions. Keep these devices isolated from internet access where possible to reduce the risk of malware infections.

- Cross-verification of Transactions: Ensure that all multisig signers review transaction data on different devices to detect any manipulation. If the same transaction appears differently on separate devices, it should trigger an immediate investigation.
- Timelocks and Governance: Introduce timelocks to delay critical operations such as ownership transfers or large fund movements. Use governance processes to require community or multi-layer multisig approval for contract upgrades or ownership changes.

3. Hardware Wallet Vulnerabilities
How They Occur:
Hardware wallets provide offline storage of private keys, adding a layer of security against #hacks . However, they can still be exploited through indirect means:
- Man-in-the-Middle Attacks: If a computer interacting with a hardware wallet is compromised, attackers can intercept and alter transaction requests before they are displayed on the hardware wallet screen. The user might sign a transaction believing it is legitimate, when in reality they are approving a malicious one.
- Physical Attacks: Supply chain attacks can compromise hardware wallets at the manufacturing level, where malware is introduced during the production process. If the hardware wallet is tampered with before it reaches the user, attackers can potentially access the private keys.
- Malware-Based Attacks: Like in the Radiant Capital hack, Trojans can replace legitimate transactions with malicious ones before they are sent to the hardware wallet, leading to unauthorized actions, such as contract upgrades or ownership transfers.
Mitigation Measures:
- Use Air-gapped Devices: Sign transactions using air-gapped devices that are not connected to the internet to reduce exposure to malware.

- Cross-check Transactions: Ensure users always check the transaction details on their hardware wallet’s screen before confirming, comparing them with the intended action.

- Regular Firmware Updates: Keep hardware wallets updated with the latest firmware to patch any potential vulnerabilities.

- Device Authentication: Use hardware wallets from reputable manufacturers that include device authentication mechanisms to prevent tampering during the supply chain process.

4. Multisig Best Practices and Signature Verification
Even though multisig wallets add layers of security, they are not foolproof. Weaknesses often arise from how multisig transactions are verified and executed, particularly in setups involving hardware wallets.
How Vulnerabilities Occur:
- Compromised Signers: If one or more signers in a multisig wallet are compromised, attackers can manipulate transaction requests, as seen in the Radiant Capital hack. The infection of team members' computers allowed for manipulation of multisig transactions before the hardware wallet even signed them.

- Weak Cross-Verification: Multisig signers may assume that because they are in a secure setup, they do not need to verify transactions across multiple devices. This assumption can be exploited by attackers who alter transaction requests at the endpoint.
Mitigation Measures:
- Distributed Signing: Multisig signers should verify transactions across multiple devices and display methods to detect potential discrepancies in the data.

- Anomaly Detection: Use anomaly detection systems to flag unusual transactions for review. Any inconsistencies between what is shown to different multisig signers should trigger a halt in the transaction.

5. Mitigation Lessons from Radiant Capital's Attack
The Radiant Capital hack is a reminder that even the most sophisticated systems are vulnerable to multi-layered attacks that blend malware, multisig exploitation, and hardware wallet manipulation. The attack showed that combining multiple vulnerabilities (Trojan malware, hardware wallet interception, and atomic execution) can create an exploit that bypasses many traditional defenses.
Key lessons:
- Always Assume Endpoints Can Be Compromised: Even with a secure hardware wallet, attackers can intercept and modify transactions at the computer level. Therefore, endpoint security must be a top priority.

- Atomic Execution Monitoring: Implement real-time monitoring of atomic transactions that can flag malicious activity before they are executed on-chain.

- Governance and Timelock Mechanisms: Timelocks should be mandatory for sensitive operations, and governance processes should be in place to delay or prevent suspicious actions.
By adopting a multi-layered approach to security, including smart contract audits, endpoint protections, and cross-verification of transactions, developers and users can better safeguard their assets from the increasingly sophisticated landscape of crypto exploits.
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