BitTorrent Token (BTTC) MATCHMAKING Part - 2 đđđ
How this inclusion takes places will vary depending on how the client's choking algorithm is implemented. When it comes time for the client to run its choking algorithm, it first compiles a list of eligible bids. The example algorithm described above could be modified to sort peers by a combination of highest eligible bid and most data received.
When an eligible bidder is unchoked, the service provider will send a new BitTorrent protocol extension bid response message to the bidder containing the rate in BTT/byte the bidder is expected to pay. This message will be followed by a normal unchoke message.
Clients may implement any auction format, but a variant of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction is expected to produce optimum results. See Figure 2 for an outline of the auction mechanics, which ends up being a multi-unit uniform price auction.
Each service requester bids on only one unchoke slot per service provider. Clients would charge each unchoked bidder the rate of the highest losing bid.
Caution must be exercised when dealing with optimistic unchoking due to its importance in allowing new peers to bootstrap into the swarm. The optimistic unchoke slots) should not be subject to the same auction format as the regular unchoke slots. If the client is using a round-robin algorithm for optimistic unchoking, it should only apply an auction to break ties between peers which have gone the same amount of time since being choked. This means auctioning of the optimistic unchoke slot will typically only happen between bidders that have never been unchoked.
In swarms with both BTTC-enabled BitTorrent clients and legacy BitTorrent clients, service requesters will be able to offer BTT to service providers. However, upload speeds from legacy BitTorrent clients will be maximized without regard for any BTTC bids.
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