Original Source: Microsoft Security Threat Intelligence
Over the past several years, the cryptocurrency market has considerably expanded, gaining the interest of investors and threat actors. Cryptocurrency itself has been used by cybercriminals for their operations, notably for ransom payment in ransomware attacks, but we have also observed threat actors directly targeting organizations within the cryptocurrency industry for financial gain. Attacks targeting this market have taken many forms, including fraud, vulnerability exploitation, fake applications, and usage of info stealers, as attackers attempt to get their hands on cryptocurrency funds.
We are also seeing more complex attacks wherein the threat actor shows great knowledge and preparation, taking steps to gain their target’s trust before deploying payloads. For example, Microsoft recently investigated an attack where the threat actor, tracked as DEV-0139, took advantage of Telegram chat groups to target cryptocurrency investment companies. DEV-0139 joined Telegram groups used to facilitate communication between VIP clients and cryptocurrency exchange platforms and identified their target from among the members. The threat actor posed as representatives of another cryptocurrency investment company, and in October 2022 invited the target to a different chat group and pretended to ask for feedback on the fee structure used by cryptocurrency exchange platforms. The threat actor had a broader knowledge of this specific part of the industry, indicating that they were well prepared and aware of the current challenge the targeted companies may have.
After gaining the target’s trust, DEV-0139 then sent a weaponized Excel file with the name OKX Binance & Huobi VIP fee comparision.xls which contained several tables about fee structures among cryptocurrency exchange companies. The data in the document was likely accurate to increase their credibility. This weaponized Excel file initiates the following series of activities:
A malicious macro in the weaponized Excel file abuses UserForm of VBA to obfuscate the code and retrieve some data.
The malicious macro drops another Excel sheet embedded in the form and executes it in invisible mode. The said Excel sheet is encoded in base64, and dropped into C:\ProgramData\Microsoft Media\ with the name VSDB688.tmp
The file VSDB688.tmp downloads a PNG file containing three executables: a legitimate Windows file named logagent.exe, a malicious version of the DLL wsock32.dll, and an XOR encoded backdoor.
The file logagent.exe is used to sideload the malicious wsock32.dll, which acts as a DLL proxy to the legitimate wsock32.dll. The malicious DLL file is used to load and decrypt the XOR encoded backdoor that lets the threat actor remotely access the infected system.
Figure 1. Overview of the attack
Further investigation through our telemetry led to the discovery of another file that uses the same DLL proxying technique. But instead of a malicious Excel file, it is delivered in an MSI package for a CryptoDashboardV2 application, dated June 2022. This may suggest other related campaigns are also run by the same threat actor, using the same techniques.
In this blog post, we will present the details uncovered from our investigation of the attack against a cryptocurrency investment company, as well as analysis of related files, to help similar organizations understand this kind of threat, and prepare for possible attacks. Researchers at Volexity recently published their findings on this attack as well.
As with any observed nation state actor activity, Microsoft directly notifies customers that have been targeted or compromised, providing them with the information they need to secure their accounts. Microsoft uses DEV-#### designations as a temporary name given to an unknown, emerging, or a developing cluster of threat activity, allowing Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) to track it as a unique set of information until we reach a high confidence about the origin or identity of the actor behind the activity. Once it meets the criteria, a DEV is converted to a named actor.
Initial compromise
To identify the targets, the threat actor sought out members of cryptocurrency investment groups on Telegram. In the specific attack, DEV-0139 got in touch with their target on October 19, 2022 by creating a secondary Telegram group with the name <NameOfTheTargetedCompany> <> OKX Fee Adjustment and inviting three employees. The threat actor created fake profiles using details from employees of the company OKX. The screenshot below shows the real accounts and the malicious ones for two of the users present in the group.
Figure 2. Legitimate profiles of cryptocurrency exchange employees (left) and fake profiles created by the threat actor (right)
It’s worth noting that the threat actor appears to have a broad knowledge of the cryptocurrency industry and the challenges the targeted company may face. The threat actor asked questions about fee structures, which are the fees used by crypto exchange platforms for trading. The fees are a big challenge for investment funds as they represent a cost and must be optimized to minimize impact on margin and profits. Like many other companies in this industry, the largest costs come from fees charged by exchanges. This is a very specific topic that demonstrates how the threat actor was advanced and well prepared before contacting their target.
After gaining the trust of the target, the threat actor sent a weaponized Excel document to the target containing further details on the fees to appear legitimate. The threat actor used the fee structure discussion as an opportunity to ask the target to open the weaponized Excel file and fill in their information.
Weaponized Excel file analysis
The weaponized Excel file, which has the file name OKX Binance & Huobi VIP fee comparision.xls (Sha256: abca3253c003af67113f83df2242a7078d5224870b619489015e4fde060acad0), is well crafted and contains legitimate information about the current fees used by some crypto exchanges. The metadata extracted showed that the file was created by the user Wolf:
Figure 3. The information in the malicious Excel file
The macro is obfuscated and abuses UserForm (a feature used to create windows) to store data and variables. In this case, the name of the UserForm is IFUZYDTTOP, and the macro retrieves the information with the following code IFUZYDTTOP.MgQnQVGb.Caption where MgQnQVGb is the name of the label in the UserForm and .caption allows to retrieve the information stored into the UserForm.
The table below shows the data retrieved from the UserForm:
The macro retrieves some parameters from the UserForm as well as another XLS file stored in base64. The XLS file is dropped into the directory C:\ProgramData\Microsoft Media as VSDB688.tmp and runs in invisible mode.
Figure 4. The deobfuscated code to load the extracted worksheet in invisible mode.
Additionally, the main sheet in the Excel file is protected with the password dragon to encourage the target to enable the macros. The sheet is then unprotected after installing and running the other Excel file stored in Base64. This is likely used to trick the user to enable macros and not raise suspicion.
Extracted worksheet
The second Excel file, VSDB688.tmp (Sha256: a2d3c41e6812044573a939a51a22d659ec32aea00c26c1a2fdf7466f5c7e1ee9), is used to retrieve a PNG file that is parsed later by the macro to extract two executable files and the encrypted backdoor. Below is the metadata for the second worksheet:
Figure 5. The second file is completely empty but contains the same UserForm abuse technique as the first stage.
The table below shows the deobfuscated data retrieved from the UserForm:
The macro retrieves some parameters from the UserForm then downloads a PNG file from hxxps://od.lk/d/d021d412be456a6f78a0052a1f0e3557dcfa14bf25f9d0f1d0d2d7dcdac86c73/Background.png. The file was no longer available at the time of analysis, indicating that the threat actor likely deployed it only for this specific attack.
Figure 6. Deobfuscated code that shows the download of the file Background.png
The PNG is then split into three parts and written in three different files: the legitimate file logagent.exe, a malicious version of wsock32.dll, and the XOR encrypted backdoor with the GUID (56762eb9-411c-4842-9530-9922c46ba2da). The three files are used to load the main payload to the target system.
Figure 7. The three files are written into C:\\ProgramData\SoftwareCache\ and run using the CreateProcess API
Loader analysis
Two of the three files extracted from the PNG file, logagent.exe and wsock32.dll, are used to load the XOR encrypted backdoor. The following sections present our in-depth analysis of both files.
Logagent.exe
Logagent.exe (Hash: 8400f2674892cdfff27b0dfe98a2a77673ce5e76b06438ac6110f0d768459942) is a legitimate system application used to log errors from Windows Media Player and send the information for troubleshooting.
The file contains the following metadata, but it is not signed:
The logagent.exe imports function from the wsock32.dll which is abused by the threat actor to load malicious code into the targeted system. To trigger and run the malicious wsock32.dll, logagent.exe is run with the following arguments previously retrieved by the macro: 56762eb9-411c-4842-9530-9922c46ba2da /shadow. Both arguments are then retrieved by wsock32.dll. The GUID 56762eb9-411c-4842-9530-9922c46ba2da is the filename for the malicious wsock32.dll to load and /shadow is used as an XOR key to decrypt it. Both parameters are needed for the malware to function, potentially hindering isolated analysis.
Figure 8. Command line execution from the running process logagent.exe
Wsock32.dll
The legitimate wsock32.dll is the Windows Socket API used by applications to handle network connections. In this attack, the threat actor used a malicious version of wsock32.dll to evade detection. The malicious wsock32.dll is loaded by logagent.exe through DLL side-loading and uses DLL proxying to call the legitimate functions from the real wsock32.dll and avoid detection. DLL proxying is a hijacking technique where a malicious DLL sits in between the application calling the exported function and a legitimate DLL that implements that exported function. In this attack, the malicious wsock32.dll acts as a proxy between logagent.exe and the legitimate wsock32.dll.
It is possible to notice that the DLL is forwarding the call to the legitimate functions by looking at the import address table:
Figure 9. Import Address Table from
Figure 10. Retrieving data with PeStudio revealed the original file name for the malicious wsock32.dll.
When the malicious wsock32.dll is loaded, it first retrieves the command line, and checks if the file with the GUID as a filename is present in the same directory using the CreateFile API to retrieve a file handle.
Figure 11. Verification of the presence of the file 56762eb9-411c-4842-9530-9922c46ba2da for decryption
The malicious wsock32.dll loads and decodes the final implant into the memory with the GUID name which is used to remote access the infected machine.
Once the file is loaded into the memory, it gives remote access to the threat actor. At the time of the analysis, we could not retrieve the final payload. However, we identified another variant of this attack and retrieved the payload, which is discussed in the next section. Identified implants were connecting back to the same command-and-control (C2) server.
Related attack
We identified another file using a similar mechanism as logagent.exe and delivering the same payload. The loader is packaged as an MSI package and as posed an application called CryptoDashboardV2 (Hash: e5980e18319027f0c28cd2f581e75e755a0dace72f10748852ba5f63a0c99487). After installing the MSI, it uses a legitimate application called tplink.exe to sideload the malicious DLL called DUser.dll and uses DLL proxying as well.
Figure 12. Installation details of the MSI file
Once the package is installed, it runs and side-loads the DLL using the following command: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Dashboard_v2\TPLink.exe” 27E57D84-4310-4825-AB22-743C78B8F3AA /sven, where it noticeably uses a different GUID.
Further analysis of the malicious DUser.dll showed that its original name is also HijackingLib.dll, same as the malicious wsock32.dll. This could indicate the usage of the same tool to create these malicious DLL proxies. Below are the file details of DUser.dll:
Once the DLL is running, it loads and decodes the implant in the memory and starts beaconing the same domain. In that case, the implant is using the GUID name 27E57D84-4310-4825-AB22-743C78B8F3AA and the XOR key /sven.
Implant analysis
The payload decoded in the memory by the malicious DLL is an implant used by the threat actor to remotely access the compromised machine. We were able to get the one from the second variant we uncovered. Below are the details of the payload:
Detection details
Microsoft Defender Antivirus
Microsoft Defender Antivirus detects threat components as the following malware:
TrojanDownloader:O97M/Wolfic.A
TrojanDownloader:O97M/Wolfic.B
TrojanDownloader:O97M/Wolfic.C
TrojanDownloader:Win32/Wolfic.D
TrojanDownloader:Win32/Wolfic.E
Behavior:Win32/WolficDownloader.A
Behavior:Win32/WolficDownloader.B
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint
Alerts with the following titles in the security center can indicate threat activity on your network:
An executable loaded an unexpected dll
DLL search order hijack
‘Wolfic’ malware was prevented