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Cualquiera puede ayudar a conectar a @WazirXIndia, sucedió algo sospechoso.
https://app.blocksec.com/explorer/tx/eth/0x48164d3adbab78c2cb9876f6e17f88e321097fcd14cadd57556866e4ef3e185d

Aviso legal: Se incluyen opiniones de terceros. Esto no representa una asesoría financiera. Puede haber contenido patrocinado. Lee los TyC.

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🚀BlockSec and OKX Explorer @OKXExplorer have launched a comprehensive partnership focusing on blockchain data interoperability, product integration, and API enhancements. https://blocksec.com/blog/block-sec-partners-with-okx-explorer-to-strengthen-on-chain-data-compliance

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Enhanced security measures attract more users, increase TVL, and drive ecosystem prosperity, promoting wider adoption. YESSS! Security is CRUCIAL for the growth of L2! As a security company, BlockSec offers an effective solution for L2 networks with the Sequencer Threat Overwatch Program (S.T.O.P). Leveraging BlockSec Phalcon's @Phalcon_xyz excellent threat detection capabilities, S.T.O.P brings innovative security solutions to L2. Find out more here🔗 https://t.co/6FaQqgFH5L #BlockchainSecurity #L2Innovation #DevCon2024

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Our investigation on meme coin SHAR Pump and Dump on #Solana https://metasleuth.io/blog/pump-dump-shar-MetaSleuth

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We have released our dataset on Web3 phishing website detection, containing 26,333 phishing URLs. Feel free to use the dataset for further research and development of better anti-phishing solutions. https://github.com/blocksecteam/TxPhishScope

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.@OnyxDAO was attacked, resulting in a loss of nearly $4M. The root cause was unverified user input during the liquidation process. Specifically, key parameters of the liquidateWithSingleRepay function in the NFTLiquidation contract were controllable by the attacker, allowing manipulation of the extraRepayAmount variable through the repayAmount parameter. By exploiting this, the attacker was able to liquidate all collateral with just one token. The key attack steps are summarized as follows: 1. The attacker first deposited oETH and borrowed various assets to reach the liquidation threshold. Simultaneously, they created a new contract that, through a donation attack and precision loss (inherent from the Compound V2 fork), reduced the oETH exchange rate, making the attacker's position eligible for liquidation. 2. The attacker then performed the liquidation. Due to insufficient parameter validation, the attacker manipulated the extraRepayAmount variable, which was added to the calculation of how many tokens needed to be liquidated. This allowed the attacker to obtain more oETH through liquidation, leading to a profit. Attack Tx:

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