Let’s expand on the answers to the three questions in the title:

1.1 Multi-model design is the same as Maker DAO, both adopt a multi-collateral model (this model is not new)

However, under the same multi-collateralization model, Lista chose more updated LST as the anchor asset for replacing stablecoins.
Although MakerDAO also has LST as a collateral asset, ListaDAO is undoubtedly more aggressive than MakerDAO and uses more new LST assets (most of which appeared in this cycle).

1.2 Risks of Lista’s radical design

Although Lista's stablecoin lending is based on over-collateralization, the design of emerging LST assets as anchors for stablecoin lending itself to risks brought about by the instability of these emerging assets themselves.

This is also a common risk for all those who use emerging LST or even LRT assets as anchors.

  • Take ezETH as an example. It has been “decoupled” from its native assets some time ago. As a downstream LSDFI business undertaker, liquidation caused by this decoupling is unavoidable.

However, because of the multi-collateral design, as the pledge categories mature, the negative impact of the de-anchoring of a single asset will become smaller.

The largest portion of the current stablecoin LST lending is the LST assets of the protocol itself, and the second and third are LST assets with a more Binance flavor. Therefore, it is very appropriate to call Lista DAO "Maker DAO on the BNB chain".

  • Note: snBNB is slisBNB

2.1 Similarities with LUNA

When ENA was first launched, because it involved stablecoin business, many people compared it with LUNA, and even believed that ENA and LUNA had certain logical similarities.

  • But in fact, Lista's stablecoin regulation mechanism is more like LUNA (but not the same)

Because they almost all have the concept of a "stable pool", of course, this concept is created by me to help you understand. In other words, the stability mechanism of the two stablecoins is based on arbitrage demand to do water filling and pumping to maintain stability.

2.2 Differences in details

However, unlike Luna, UST's stability standard adjustment is based on the token of the protocol itself, while Lista is a basket of LST assets + native assets (the current share is not large)

But their stability principles are based on arbitrage, that is, in this stable pool

(1) If the stablecoin has a premium, then OTC users will have the motivation to borrow more premium stablecoins to arbitrage other assets based on this premium;

(2) If the stablecoin is discounted, users with collateralized positions will have the motivation to purchase the stablecoin and redeem the collateralized assets at a lower price.

In order to avoid the vicious circle caused by buying and selling based solely on arbitrage, Lista will also adjust the interest rate levels for borrowing and locking supply (mining) based on the positive and negative premium situations.

  • PS: Holding lisUSD can participate in the liquidity mining on the chain, but I will not go into too much detail in this chapter

3.1 You have heard of the blockchain impossible triangle, so what is the "stablecoin trilemma" problem?

That is, a stablecoin design, but their design cannot simultaneously meet decentralization, price stability and positive capital efficiency

(1) Decentralization: Web3 decentralization usually has two aspects. One is whether the governance of the protocol is decentralized. This question is difficult to measure. At the same time, I also believe that the protocol can only achieve decentralization of the mechanism, but it is difficult to achieve absolute decentralization in decision-making.

  • Wherever there is gathering, authority tends to be generated; wherever there is authority, it can dominate the direction.

Therefore, decentralization here refers to the use of "decentralized" assets as collateral. Although we look deeper, it is difficult to find a native asset that is definitely decentralized. But it is difficult to make strict demands on this decentralization issue because there are always problems to be found.

(2) Price stability: This is easy to understand. It refers to whether stablecoins or assets that realize value through anchoring can continue to maintain the required anchored value.

(3) Positive capital efficiency: This is a topic that needs to be discussed around all assets. To put it simply, one dollar can be exchanged for a corresponding amount of value.

If I can exchange one dollar for an item worth 0.5 yuan from you, then this is a negative capital efficiency thing, otherwise it is positive capital efficiency.

Take the excess collateral of native assets as an example. For example, the current price of ETH is $4,000, and I want to exchange it for the stablecoin DAI. If I can only exchange it for $2,000 of DAI, then the corresponding capital efficiency is negative.

3.2 As for whether lisUSD under the Lista framework solves the trilemma, I think it is at least logically self-consistent

(1) Decentralization is not a big deal, and it is difficult to make strict requirements

(2) Based on multiple mortgages, the interest rate design based on arbitrage and automatic adjustment provides a certain stability guarantee for the stablecoin pool

(3) Using LST (debt) as collateral anchor, the efficiency of capital that was originally locked up and released is further improved
In fact, MakerDAO, which uses LST as collateral anchor, also has the above three characteristics, but there are differences between the two in terms of collateral, back-end interest rate provision and stabilization mechanism.