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Via #AnciliaAlerts on X, @rugged_dot_art has identified a re-entrancy #vulnerability in a smart contract with address 0x9733303117504c146a4e22261f2685ddb79780ef, allowing an attacker to #exploit it and gain 11 #ETH . The attack transaction can be traced on #Etherscan at https://etherscan.io/tx/0x5a63da39b5b83fccdd825fed0226f330f802e995b8e49e19fbdd246876c67e1f. Despite reaching out to the owner three days ago, there has been no response. The vulnerability resides in the targetedPurchase() function, where a user can input arbitrary swapParams, including commands to 4. This triggers the UNIVERSAL_ROUTER.execute() function, and as per Uniswap Technical Reference, command 4 corresponds to SWEEP, invoking the sweep() function. This function sends ETH back to the user's contract, leading to a re-entrancy issue. Within targetedPurchase(), a balance check is performed before and after calling _executeSwap(). Due to the re-entrancy problem, a user can stake tokens (e.g., from a flashloan) to satisfy the balance check, ensuring a successful purchase action where tokens are transferred to the user. The urgency of the situation is underscored by the ongoing waiting period for the owner's response, emphasizing the need for prompt attention to mitigate potential exploitation.

Via #AnciliaAlerts on X, @rugged_dot_art has identified a re-entrancy #vulnerability in a smart contract with address 0x9733303117504c146a4e22261f2685ddb79780ef, allowing an attacker to #exploit it and gain 11 #ETH . The attack transaction can be traced on #Etherscan at https://etherscan.io/tx/0x5a63da39b5b83fccdd825fed0226f330f802e995b8e49e19fbdd246876c67e1f. Despite reaching out to the owner three days ago, there has been no response.

The vulnerability resides in the targetedPurchase() function, where a user can input arbitrary swapParams, including commands to 4. This triggers the UNIVERSAL_ROUTER.execute() function, and as per Uniswap Technical Reference, command 4 corresponds to SWEEP, invoking the sweep() function. This function sends ETH back to the user's contract, leading to a re-entrancy issue.

Within targetedPurchase(), a balance check is performed before and after calling _executeSwap(). Due to the re-entrancy problem, a user can stake tokens (e.g., from a flashloan) to satisfy the balance check, ensuring a successful purchase action where tokens are transferred to the user. The urgency of the situation is underscored by the ongoing waiting period for the owner's response, emphasizing the need for prompt attention to mitigate potential exploitation.

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